In 1922 Mussolini was invited to become head of a coalition government. While Fascism was now in the government, Mussolini did not have the complete control of parliament that both he and his supporters wanted. Thus in the years immediately following, Mussolini's governmental policies were mainly aligned to consolidating and extending his power over Italy's political institutions. With the Acerbo electoral law in 1923 the Fascists were able to take two thirds of the seats at the next elections, thus guaranteeing their dominance of parliament. Following this success Mussolini began a transformation of the political processes, which gave him the authority and confidence to pursue domestic policies to fulfil his social and economic aims.
One of the key aims in Mussolini's domestic policy was to build Italy's economy to a level where it could rival the great industrial powers of the post-war period, namely Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, Germany in Europe. At the time Italy's economy was backward and agricultural, especially in the economically destitute South. A massive program of industrialisation would need to be carried out in order to bring the economy up to the standards of Northwest Europe. Mussolini also needed economic success to keep public opinion on his side. In this respect he was lucky to have been able to ride the European-wide boom of the 1920's whilst allowing his finance minister, De Stefani, to follow orthodox economic policies. However, simply being carried along on a wave of economic success would not make Italy an important industrial power. In one of his most successful economic policies, Mussolini launched the IMI to provide credit to encourage industrial development, whilst the simultaneously created IRI allowed Mussolini control of many key industries as it provided finance for firms producing goods such as steel, electricity and machine-tools. However, as a domestic policy the success of such a scheme must be judged to have been flawed, as it made no impact on the north-south divide as new developments were by and large centred on the North. In addition corruption, which so regularly leaked into Italian politics, diminished the effectiveness of the IRI. Although Mussolini could theoretically control the production of the major industries, bribes and the proverbial 'nod and wink' to officials responsible for carrying out his orders, as well as generous donations to party funds by firms in these industries often made a mockery of the fascist's supposed control. With industry on a long leash and the South still in a medieval economic state Mussolini's apparent success in industrialising Italy with a national purpose was always mostly rhetoric flattered by outside factors from the world economy.
Mussolini's second great economic aim was a drive towards autarchy. At the head of this drive was a scheme with a typical Fascist slogan, the 'battle for grain'. Aimed at making Italy self-sufficient in grain, it was not only a step towards making Italy stronger and less reliant on other nations, but also a grandiose domestic propaganda stunt. By sacrificing other crops and livestock the programme was always going to succeed. By appearing bare-chested labouring in the fields Mussolini was able to give the valuable impression of accord with the common Italian peasant, whilst being able to announce the success of the scheme gave the image of Fascism a golden veneer. However, there is no evidence to show that the 'battle for grain' solved a single problem in Italy. Land better suited to other crops was wasted to provide a superficial impression of economic self-reliance. The same amount of wheat could have been imported at a vastly lower cost and would have allowed other more adapted crops to have been exported and kept as surplus. Nevertheless, at least the 'battle for grain' enjoyed some superficial success. The 'battle for births' fared even worse than its sister scheme. Despite tax incentives for large families and penalties imposed on single people, the birth rate in Italy actually dropped by more than 6 per 1000 in 15 years. In retrospect it would be enormously difficult to argue that either scheme provided anything of substance to help the domestic situation in anyway once the propaganda veneer had been peeled back to reveal the cheap material beneath.
Central to Mussolini's domestic policies was a desire to control Italian society and the people. With this control he would be able to direct the efforts of the population towards the advancement of the state. A very important step in achieving this goal was the control of employment. The mechanism Mussolini developed for this purpose was the idea of the 'corporate state'. In theory this allowed ordinary people a greater say in the way the state and industry were run, by gradually concentrating power through a chain of instruction by allowing employees to elect representatives to sit alongside fascists. These people would then elect representatives who had the ear of the Duce. In theory this allowed the employees to make their views known to Mussolini, but in effect it was a method of further control over the ordinary people. As far as his aim for establishing a mechanism for control is concerned, this was a successful policy for the Duce. However, it never provided the essential motivation amongst those at the bottom necessary for it to have any profound effect upon day to day life at work.
In addition to the 'corporate state', Mussolini's other main policy towards employment was the creation of jobs through public works. The production of roads, dams etc. was intended to destroy unemployment and diminish opposition to Mussolini's other policies. With stable jobs most Italians would be unlikely to question the regime and may have increased their enthusiasm for initiatives. While the public works lasted these provided jobs for many Italians and should be viewed as a success. However, the works could not carry on indefinitely and the money spent on the schemes may have been more effective if invested in developing industry or correcting the North-south divide.
Not all of Mussolini's social policies were aimed at control of the population. In Italy two other forces had large influence which could have interfered with his objectives. One was the reigning monarch who had shown his unwillingness to confront Mussolini over the Matteoti affair. The other was the Catholic Church. With its enormous influence over the decisions of millions of Italians the Church needed to be brought into an agreement with the Fascist party. T had given its support at the elections that had brought the Fascists to power, and now with several concessions such as allowing Catholic priests into schools and settling the land dispute, the Church was brought into the Concordat. This policy is widely regarded as having been one of the most successful of the Fascist era. It solved a dispute, which if left could not only have damaged Mussolini's social aims but could also have been a feature of Italian politics today.
To control the population at large Mussolini needed to implement policies that would indoctrinate the people en masse and limit the information most people would be allowed to see. To do this, two new organisations were formed. The Ministry for Popular Culture aimed to place mass media under the state's control, and began with the typically totalitarian policy of introducing censorship into newspaper production and radio broadcasting. It also sponsors films glorifying the achievement of Fascists in a crude attempt to show the greatness of the movement. Meanwhile to indoctrinate the youth of Italy, the Opera Nationale Ballila was formed with sections for different age groups. The aim of the ONB was to educate children in the greatness of Fascism and to make them more aggressive and accustomed to military regalia and customs as part of Mussolini's aim to create a warlike nation. While these two organisations both largely achieved the goals laid down for them they did little to solve the problems faced by Italy at the time bar making the population more passive.
The sister organisation of the ONB, the Opera Nationale Dopolavoro was set up as an organisation for adult entertainment. It was intended to provide mass leisure activities to the people of Italy at low cost. It also gave aid to the poor in certain areas. It is uncertain whether the OND was a cynical propaganda ploy to win the goodwill of the population or whether it was a generous domestic policy aimed at genuinely improving the lives of Italians. It was undoubtedly extremely popular. As an attempt to improve the lives of Italians it succeeded on the level it was aimed at. However, there were many more serious problems in Italy at the time than a lack of mass leisure, and the money spent on this scheme may have been better aligned elsewhere.
From the analysis of Mussolini's domestic policies several general statements can be made. It the majority of cases the rhetoric surrounding the initiative more than flattered the end result. It is dubious whether any of Mussolini's key aims in his policies were compatible with a desire to solve the major problems in Italy at the time. In many cases the policies could be said to have succeeded as far as they achieved the goal laid down for them, but this often had little to do with the fundamental difficulties that needed addressing. In general Mussolini's policies appear to have been in essence a sharp arrow of rhetoric with no substance to fire it at the problems that needed to be solved.